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Abstract
This paper studies screening problems with quasilinear preferences,
where agents’ private information is two-dimensional and the alloca-
tion instrument is one-dimensional. A pre-order in the set of types
is defined comparing types by their marginal valuation for the instru-
ment, which allows reducing the incentive compatibility constraints
that must be checked. With this approach, the discretized problem
becomes computationally tractable. As an application, it is numer-
ically solved an example from Lewis and Sappington [Lewis, T. and
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1 Introduction
Although the importance of multi-dimensions for modeling agents’ charac-
teristics in adverse selection problems is recognized, there are few models
analyzed in the literature even when the agents’ characteristics are two-
dimensional continuously distributed and the principal’s instrument is one-
dimensional. This is because of the inherent difficulty of the problem for
finding explicit solutions and to the challenging task of obtaining numerical
approximations.
The purpose of this article is to provide a methodology that can be used
for numerically solving a wide variety of such adverse selection problems.
The main assumption is that the agent’s marginal valuation can be ranked
respect to each one of the private information parameters.
In contrast to most of the numerical approaches to approximate the solu-
tion, this study does not consider the incomplete or relax problem in which
the constraints are obtained from the necessary conditions of the original
problem (Wilson (1996), Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999)), neither focus on
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straints (Berg and Ehtamo (2009)), nor it appeals to optimization methods
for the complete problem (Judd et al. (2018)). It explores the idea −from
the unidimensional case− that a priori eliminates some constraints when the
set of types is finite and the Spence-Mirrlees condition holds.
In the multidimensional case, it is well known that the lack of an exoge-
nous order among types makes the problem difficult to solve. That is, there
is not a satisfactory generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition1. One
of the novelties of this article is the introduction of a pre-order in the set
of types by comparing the marginal valuation for the instrument. With this
definition, it is proved that it is sufficient to consider that each type does
not want to imitate any type on a subset of the boundary of the type space.
As a consequence, a significant number of incentive constraints are ruled out
in the discretized problem, thus making it computationally tractable for a
relatively fine discretization.
With this methodology, it is numerically solved the regulation model
introduced by Lewis and Sappington (1988b) and then reviewed by Arm-
strong (1999), who showed that Lewis and Sappington’s solution was incor-
1McAfee and McMillan (1988) proposed a generalization of the single-crossing condition
according to which bunching is linear.
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rect. Since this is a model with an unknown analytical solution, it might be
meaningful to know the numerical solution. Besides, Armstrong (1999) has
conjectured that it is optimal to exclude a positive mass of agents, as in the
non-linear pricing setting. However, the numerical solution suggests that the
exclusion should not be optimal in this case.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is described (in the style
of Mussa and Rosen (1978)) in Section 2. In Section 3 the endogenously
determined isoquants are analyzed through a partial differential equation de-
rived from the incentive compatibility constraints2. Section 4 is dedicated to
explaining the reduction of incentive constraints, establishes the discretized
problem, and study asymptotic properties when discretization becomes finer.
The regulation model of Lewis and Sappington (1988b) is numerically solved
−for particular parameters− in Section 5, and I provide some considera-
tions about the optimality of exclusion. In Appendix A the method is tested
by comparing the numerical solutions with the analytic solutions for some
models from the literature. All proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Model
Consider a monopolistic firm producing a single product q ∈ R+ at cost C(q).
Customers’ characteristics, reflecting their preferences over the products, are
captured by a bidimensional vector (a, b) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] which is labeled as
its type. This type is private information for each customer, but the firm
knows the probability distribution over [0, 1]2 according to a differentiable
density function ρ(a, b) > 0. The utility of customer’s type (a, b) is quasi-
linear v(q, a, b)− t where v(q, a, b) is the value for consumption q ∈ R+, and
t ∈ R+ is the monetary transfer.
The firm designs a menu of options to offer to the agent specifying the
quantity and the corresponding payment according with customers’ type re-
vealed. By the revelation principle (Myerson (1979)), it is sufficient to restrict
attention to contracts where true-telling is the best response for customers.
Thus, in order to maximize expected revenue, the monopolist’s problem is
max
q(·),t(·)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
t(a, b)− C(q(a, b))
)
ρ(a, b)da db (MP)
2This analysis is presented with more detail in Araujo et al. (2019).
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subject to
v(q(a, b), a, b)− t(a, b) ≥ v(q(a′, b′), a, b)− t(a′, b′) (IC)
and
v(q(a, b), a, b)− t(a, b) ≥ 0 (IR)
Labels (IC) and (IR) refers to incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality constraints. It is assumed that reservation utility is type independent
and normalized at zero. For an incentive compatible contract (q(·), t(·)) the
informational rent is defined as
V (a, b) = v(q(a, b), a, b)− t(a, b)
This variable V is used to eliminate monetary transfer. The monopolist’
problem can now be set as
max
q(·),V (·)
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
v(q(a, b), a, b)− C(q(a, b))− V (a, b))
)
ρ(a, b)da db (1)
subject to
(IC) V (a, b)− V (â, b̂) ≥ v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− v(q(â, b̂), â, b̂) ∀ (a, b), (â, b̂) ∈ [0, 1]2
(IR) V (a, b) ≥ 0 ∀ (a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2
Assumptions. Agent’s valuation function v is three times differentiable, and
cost function C is differentiable. Also, it is verified:
1. v(qout, a, b) is constant.
2. vqa > 0 and vqb < 0.
Assumption 1 is usually presented as v(0, a, b) = 0 because in nonlinear
pricing the exit option is qout = 0, and any agent assigns it zero value.
However, in other adverse selection problems qout could be endogenously
determined. Assumption 2 is the single-crossing condition in each direction,
i.e., agent’s marginal valuation can be ranked respect to each one of the
private information parameters. It has been assumed those particular signs,
but what really matters is the uniform signs of vqa and vqb. As a consequence,
it requires that an implementable q(a, b) be non-decreasing with respect to
a and non-increasing with respect to b.
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If, additionally, the following condition is satisfied:
va ≥ 0 and vb ≤ 0 (*)
then the informational rent V is non-decreasing with respect to a and non-
increasing with respect to b (since V (a, b) is the optimal value of agent’s
maximization problem, by the Envelope Theorem Va(a, b) = va(q(a, b), a, b)
and Vb(a, b) = vb(q(a, b), a, b), hence Va ≥ 0 and Vb ≤ 0). Thus, it will be
sufficient to impose V (0, 1) = 0 and all the IR constraints will be fulfilled.
Unless otherwise stated, condition (*) will not be treated as an assump-
tion for our model because the main issue is about IC constraints.
From now on, let us restrict attention on piecewise twice-differentiable
and continuous contracts (q, t).
3 Characteristic Curves
In this section, it is summarized the methodology used by Araujo et al. (2019)
to derive a partial differential equation which determines iso-quantity curves.
Let (q, t) be an incentive compatible contract twice-differentiable at (a, b).
Then, (a, b) must solve the problem
max
(a′,b′)∈[0,1]2
{v(q(a′, b′), a, b)− t(a′, b′)} (2)
The first-order necessary optimality conditions for problem (2) are
vq(q(a, b), a, b)qa(a, b) = ta(a, b)
vq(q(a, b), a, b)qb(a, b) = tb(a, b)
(3)
From the equations in (3), the cross derivatives tab and tba can be calculated.
Finally, by using Schwarz’s integrability condition tab(a, b) = tba(a, b), the
following quasi-linear PDE is derived
−
vqb
vqa
qa + qb = 0 a.e. in [0, 1]
2 (4)
Define Γ0 = {(r, 0) : r ∈ [0, 1]}, let φ be a function defined over [0, 1],
and consider the initial value problem
−
vqb
vqa
qa + qb = 0
q|Γ0 = φ(r)
(5)
5
Following the method of characteristic curves3there is a family of plane char-
acteristics curves (a(r, s), b(r, s)) defined by:
as(r, s) = −
vqb
vqa
(φ(r), a(r, s), b(r, s)) , a(r, 0) = r
bs(r, s) = 1 , b(r, 0) = 0
(6)
That is, for a fix r ∈ [0, 1] the characteristic curve (a(r, s), b(r, s)) parametrized
by s ∈ [0, s(r)] is an isoquant of q(·) at level φ(r). Such a function φ must
be optimally determined, which endogenously defines isoquants of q(·). This
idea was developed in Araujo et al. (2019).
Note that characteristic curves are strictly increasing because, by As-
sumption 2, both entries of the vector tangent (as, bs) are positive.
4 Reduction of Incentive Constraints
When numerically solving the problem, the main difficulty is related to the
number of constraints. This is because after discretizing the type set [0, 1]2
into a grid of n points over each axis, there are n4−n2 IC constraints. There-
fore, fine discretizations result in memory storage problems. Next, it is pre-
sented a methodology that allows us to reduce the number of IC constraints.
It is inspired by the ideas to address IC constraints in the unidimensional case
with a finite type set when single-crossing holds (see Laffont and Martimort
(2001)).
In bidimensional models, there is not a condition similar to the single-
crossing in the unidimensional case where all types can be exogenously or-
dered by their marginal valuation for consumption. This is because in one-
dimension vqθ > 0 is equivalent to θ1 < θ2 =⇒ vq(q, θ1) < vq(q, θ2) , ∀q ∈ Q .
Then, to be able to compare a priori two different types at least partially, it
is introduced the following binary relation:
Definition 1. Given (a, b), (â, b̂) ∈ [0, 1]2, we say that (a, b) is worse than
(â, b̂), denoted by (a, b)  (â, b̂), if and only if
vq(q, a, b) ≤ vq(q, â, b̂) ∀ q ∈ Q
3See Evans (1998) for a description of the method.
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Note that  is a pre-order (reflexive and transitive) on [0, 1]2. This defini-
tion try to capture the idea that when (a, b)  (â, b̂), the (a, b)-agent has no
incentive to announce the type (â, b̂) because for any q ∈ Q, the (â, b̂)−agent
has greater marginal valuation for consumption and is willing to pay more
for each additional unit of the product.
As a direct consequence of Assumption 2, type (a, b) is worse than any
type in the southeast.
Proposition 4.1. Given (a, b), if â > a and b̂ < b, then (a, b)  (â, b̂)
By fixing type (a, b), the IC constraints with any type in the southeast
are a priori excluded, as the difficulty comes from better agents willing to
claim that they are worse agents rather than the reverse. Specifically, given
(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2, the following IC constraints are omitted:
V (a, b)− V (â, b̂) ≥ v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− v(q(â, b̂), â, b̂) ∀ â > a , b̂ < b (7)
Next proposition shows that these constraints are indeed fulfilled when
(q, V ) satisfies the necessary conditions related to the envelope theorem and
the monotonicity of q(·, ·) over each axis.
Proposition 4.2. Assume (q, V ) is such that
Va(a, b) = va(q(a, b), a, b) , Vb(a, b) = vb(q(a, b), a, b) , qa ≥ 0 , qb ≤ 0
By fixing (a, b), the constraints given in (7) are satisfied.
Denote by CC(â, b̂) the planar characteristic curve that contains (â, b̂).
Additionally, the expression “ (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂) ” means that
V (a, b)− V (â, b̂) ≥ v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− v(q(â, b̂), â, b̂)
The following proposition shows that it is sufficient to verify the IC constraint
with a representative type over each characteristic curve.
Proposition 4.3. Let (a, b), (â, b̂) be such that (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂). Then
(a, b) is IC with (x, y) , ∀ (x, y) ∈ CC(â, b̂)
As a consequence, we can focus on the border of [0, 1]2. The following
proposition is key to reduce the restrictions.
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Proposition 4.4. Let (x, y), (â, b̂), and (a, b) be such that (a, b) is IC with
(â, b̂) and (â, b̂) is IC with (x, y). If (â, b̂)  (a, b) and q(x, y) ≤ q(â, b̂), then
(a, b) is IC with (x, y).
Due to the kind of transitivity shown in Proposition 4.4, it is not necessary
that type (a, b) verifies the IC constraints with all the types (x, y) on the left
of a certain characteristic curve. Indeed, it is sufficient to verify the IC
constraint with any type worse than (a, b) over such a curve, but making
sure that this type verifies the IC constraints with all of those (x, y).
By taking the characteristic curve as close as possible to type (a, b), most
restrictions can be eliminated. Since the characteristic curves are endoge-
nously determined but any of them passing through (a, b) intersects the bor-
der of the square [0, 1]2 on the northeast of that point, previous propositions
suggest that it would be sufficient to verify that (a, b) is IC with all the points
over the set
F (a,b) := {(s, 1) | a ≤ s ≤ 1} ∪ {(1, s) | b < s ≤ 1} (8)
which is formalized it in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Assume d
dq
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0 and d
da
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0. Let (q, V ) be such
that
∀ (a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2 , (a, b) is IC with (x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ F (a,b)
Then, (q, V ) satisfies all the incentive compatibility constraints.
Technical assumptions d
dq
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0 and d
da
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0 are given to avoid
pathological cases. This result could be understood as analogous to the
claim local IC constraints implies global IC constraints, which is right in the
unidimensional case when single-crossing holds.
4.1 Particular valuation function
The following proposition could allow us to reduce even more the IC con-
straints when the valuation function v has a special structure.
Proposition 4.5. Assume that vq is concave in a and convex in b. Let (a, b)
and (â, b̂) be in [0, 1]2 with a < â , b < b̂ . We have
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1. if (a, b)  (â, b̂) then
b̂− b
â− a
≤
−vqa(q, a, b̂)
vqb(q, a, b̂)
2. if
b̂− b
â− a
≤
−vqa(q, â, b)
vqb(q, â, b)
then (a, b)  (â, b̂)
This proposition says that, in order to (a, b)  (â, b̂), it is necessary that
CC(a, b) be on the left of CC(â, b̂), because at the point (a, b̂) the slope of
CC(a, b̂) is greater than the slope between (a, b) and (â, b̂).
Besides, a sufficient condition for (a, b)  (â, b̂) is that the slope of
CC(â, b) at the point (â, b) be greater than the slope between (a, b) and
(â, b̂). Thus, CC(â, b̂) will be at the right of CC(a, b).
4.2 Discretized problem
By Theorem 4.1, it is sufficient that each point satisfies the IC constraints
with all points over a unidimensional set instead of the whole square. Now,
the solution of the continuous problem can be approximated by discretizing
the set of types. This section is devoted to establishing this discrete problem
and discussing its limitations.
LetXn = {0,
1
n−1
, 2
n−1
, . . . , 1}×{0, 1
n−1
, 2
n−1
, . . . , 1} be the grid of n2 points
on [0, 1]2. For a fixed (a, b) with a < 1 and b < 1, let F˜ (a,b) := F (a,b) ∩ Xn,
where F (a,b) is defined in (8). Because for points over the line x = 1 or
y = 1 the constraints with the points on the northeast cannot be written, it
is equivalently considered
F˜ (a,1) =
(
{(0, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ 1} ∪ {(s, 0) : 0 ≤ s < a}
)
∩Xn
F˜ (1,b) =
(
{(0, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ b} ∪ {(s, 0) : 0 ≤ s < 1}
)
∩Xn
Thus, F˜ (a,b) is the set of types with which (a, b) must satisfy an IC constraint.
The integral in the monopolist’s objective it is approximated by the trape-
zoidal rule. Thus, consider the associated weights w(i, j) for each point
(ai, bj) ∈ Xn. Also, denote qi,j = q(ai, bj) and Vi,j = V (ai, bj). The dis-
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cretized problem we are interested in solving is the following:
max
{qi,j ,Vi,j}
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w(i, j)(v(qi,j, ai, bj)− Vi,j − C(qi,j))ρ(ai, bj)
subject to
(IC) (ai, bj) is IC with (âi, b̂j) , ∀ (âi, b̂j) ∈ F˜
(ai,bj)
(IR) Vi,j ≥ 0
(9)
Remarks:
1. In the original discretized problem, there are n4−n2 (maybe nonlinear)
IC constraints. After our methodology, the number of IC constraints
is of order n3.
2. In case condition (*) is verified, all IR constraints can be replaced by
V1,n = 0.
3. In order to obtain better accuracy of the solution, it can be considered
the monotonicity constraints qi,j ≤ qi+1,j and qi,j ≤ qi,j−1 . These 2n
2
linear restrictions do not represent large numerical costs.
4. When the valuation function has the special multiplicative separable
form v(q, a, b) = ψ(q) + α(a, b)q + β(a, b), the IC constraints become
linear in qi,j. Therefore, since the IC constraints are linear in Vi,j (re-
gardless of v), if the objective function is strictly concave4, there exists
a unique solution and we can rely on numerical approximations.
Due to discretization, it is impossible to ensure that for each type (a, b) ∈
Xn all IC constraints are fulfilled. This is because there could be some points
between CC(a, b) and the closer to the left characteristic curve intersecting
F˜ (a,b). Figure 1 illustrates this issue.
Note that the premises of Proposition 4.4 may not be true for types at
the right of CC(a, b) and violations may propagate. Nevertheless, following
Belloni et al. (2010) it is proved that the violations of the IC constraints (i.e.,
the terms for which these constraints are not satisfied) uniformly converge
4This will be the case if ψ′′ − C ′′ < 0
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ab
Figure 1: By discretization, IC constraints are not ensured with black points.
to zero with finer discretizations, and the sequence of optimal values con-
verges to the optimal value of the continuous problem. These authors have
considered a linear model including multiple agents and border constraints5,
which are not present in our setting. In contrast, it is considered a valuation
function v that could be nonlinear.
Let (Qn, V n) be the solution of the discretized problem (9). Since these
functions are defined on Xn, define the extensions Q˜
n, V˜ n : [0, 1]2 → R as
Q˜n(x, y) := Qn(a, b) , V˜ n(x, y) := V n(a, b)
where (a, b) ∈ Xn is such that a ≤ x < a+ 1n−1 and b−
1
n−1 < y ≤ b .
Let δ∗(Q˜n, V˜ n) be the supremum over all IC constraint violations by the
pair (Q˜n, V˜ n). That is, although some constraints are not fulfilled, we can
be sure that for any (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ [0, 1]2,
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(a′, b′)− (v(Q˜n(a′, b′), a, b)− v(Q˜n(a′, b′), a′, b′)) ≥ −δ∗(Q˜n, V˜ n)
To guarantee the asymptotic feasibility of extensions (Q˜n, V˜ n), all IC con-
straint violations must uniformly converge to zero, as the next proposition
shows.
Proposition 4.6. We have δ∗(Q˜n, V˜ n) ≤ O( 1
n−1
).
5These constraints are related to the allocation treated as a probability since, in their
model, there are N buyers and J degrees of product quality.
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The following proposition shows that optimality can be achieved in the
limit.
Proposition 4.7. Let OPTn be the optimal value of the discretized prob-
lem, and let OPT ∗ be the optimal value of the continuous problem. Then,
lim inf
n→∞
OPTn ≥ OPT
∗ . Additionally, if lim
n→∞
Q˜n(a, b) and lim
n→∞
V˜ n(a, b) exists
for any (a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2, then lim
n→∞
OPTn = OPT
∗ .
5 Numerical Solution: Regulating a Mono-
polist Firm
Lewis and Sappington (1988b) studied the design of regulatory policy when
the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the costs and the demand
functions of the monopolist firm he is regulating. They considered that
demand for the firm’s product q = Q(p, a) and the costs of producing output
q, C(q, b), involve firm’s private information parameters (a, b) distributed
over Θ = [a, a]× [b, b] according to a strictly positive density function f(a, b).
The regulator offers the firm a menu of unit prices p and corresponding
subsidy t, according with firm’s type revealed. The profit of the firm of type
(a, b) is pQ(p, a)−C(Q(p, a), b) + t. Profit reservation level is type indepen-
dent and normalized at zero. It is assumed that the regulator can ensure
that the firm serves all demand at the established prices. The regulator’s
objective function is the expected consumer surplus net of the transfer to
the firm∫ a
a
∫ b
b
{Π(Q(p(a, b), a), a)− p(a, b)Q(p(a, b), a)− t(a, b)}f(a, b)db da (10)
where Π(Q, a) =
∫ Q
0
P (ξ, a)dξ, and P (·) denotes the inverse demand curve.
The regulator’s problem is to design the menu of contracts (p(a, b), t(a, b))
in order to maximize (10) subject to individual rationality
p(a, b)Q(p(a, b), a)− C(Q(p(a, b), a), b) + t(a, b) ≥ 0
and incentive compatibility constraints
p(a, b)Q(p(a, b), a)−C(Q(p(a, b), a), b) + t(a, b) ≥
p(â, b̂)Q(p(â, b̂), a)− C(Q(p(â, b̂), a), b) + t(â, b̂)
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By setting
v(p, a, b) = pQ(p, a)− C(Q(p, a), b)
H(p, a) = pQ(p, a)− Π(Q(p, a), a)
V (a, b) = v(p(a, b), a, b) + t(a, b)
the regulator’s problem can be written as
max
p(·),V (·)
∫ a
a
∫ b
b
{v(p(a, b), a, b)−H(p(a, b), a)− V (a, b)}f(a, b)db da (RP)
subject to
(IR) V (a, b) ≥ 0 ∀ (a, b) ∈ Θ
(IC) V (a, b)− V (â, b̂) ≥ v(p(â, b̂), a, b)− v(p(â, b̂), â, b̂) ∀ (a, b), (â, b̂) ∈ Θ
Note that this formulation fits the standard nonlinear pricing model. In this
case, the new variable V is the firm’s profit.
Lewis and Sappington have derived a solution for the particular example
Q(p, a) = α− p+ a , C(q, b) = K + (c0 + b)q (11)
with α,K and c0 positive constants and a uniform distribution over Θ =
[0, 1]2. But, as Armstrong (1999) has noted, Lewis and Sappington’s solution
for this example cannot be right. Furthermore, in that paper, Armstrong
argued that excluding a positive mass of types should be optimal, like in
nonlinear pricing. However, because of the change in the variables he used,
the type set is not convex, and his exclusion argument cannot strictly be
applied. He also expressed the following:
• “Nevertheless, I believe that the condition that the support be convex
is strongly sufficient and that it will be the usual case that exclusion is
optimal...”
• “I have not found it possible to solve this precise example correctly...”
Therefore, we are facing a bidimensional adverse selection model with an
unknown solution where a conjecture about the optimality of exclusion was
made.
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Given that v(p, a, b) = (α + a − p)(p − c0 − b) −K, then vpa = vpb = 1.
In this case, p(·, ·) will be non-decreasing in a and b. Additionally, since
−vpb
vpa
< 0, the characteristic curves are strictly decreasing. Following the
same considerations as in Section 4, it will be sufficient that each (a, b)−agent
verifies the IC constraints with all the points over the set
F (a,b) := {(0, s) | b ≤ s ≤ 1} ∪ {(s, 1) | 0 ≤ s ≤ a}
Note that the discretized problem has a unique solution in view of the
linearity of IC constraints by the multiplicative separable form of v (see
remark 4 on page 10) and the strict concavity of the objective function. Note
also that the signs of va and vb are endogenously determined, so condition
(*) cannot be verified.
The problem was numerically solved for three different cases of c0, α, and
K. The type set was discretized into n = 51 points over each direction. The
numerical solutions were obtained via Knitro/AMPL by using the active set
algorithm. Next, it is shown the graphs of optimal prices, the firm’s profit
(solutions of (RP)), subsidies, and production level.
Case 1: c0 = 1 , α = 5 , K = 2
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Case 2: c0 = 2 , α = 4 , K = 4.5
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Case 3: c0 = 3 , α = 4.5 , K = 3
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It is also shown the numerical differences between unit prices and marginal
costs.
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Some insights from these solutions:
Due to this example derives into an optimization problem with linear con-
straints and unique solution, the numerical methods to solve it are efficient.
Thus, the statements below are reliable:
1. It seems that at the optimum6, all types (a, b) with a + b ≥ 1 are
bunching at unit price c0+1, and the subsidy for them is the fixed cost
K. Additionally, the unit price assigned to type (0, 0) seems to be c0.
2. In view of the numerical difference p − Cq, the regulator induces the
firm to price above marginal costs for almost all (a, b) types rather than
a = 0 or b = 1 (i.e., such types with the a priori lowest demand function
or such types who obtain zero profit)7.
3. The firm’s numerical profit V suggests that there is no exclusion.
5.1 About the optimality of exclusion
Although the optimality of exclusion is a generic property, perhaps the most
intriguing insight from the numerical solutions is the possibility that non-
exclusion of a positive mass of types should be optimal, contrary to Arm-
strong’s conjecture stated previously.
Furthermore, in Barelli et al. (2014), the authors relaxed Armstrong’s
strong conditions (strict convexity and homogeneity of degree one) and proved
a more general result of the generic desirability of exclusion. For this exam-
ple, they considered that prices belong to [c0 + 1, α] to conclude that their
result can be applied and hence confirm Armstrong’s conjecture. However,
the numerical results show that prices do not belong to [c0+1, α]. Therefore,
their theorem should not be applied.
6I conjecture the optimum price p to be p(a, b) = c0 + a + b when a + b ≤ 1 and
p(a, b) = c0 + 1 when a+ b > 1
7 In Baron and Myerson (1982), the authors analyzed a model in which the regulator is
uncertain only about the firm’s cost function. At the optimum, prices are above marginal
costs for all cost realizations other than the lowest. In the model of Lewis and Sappington
(1988a), the regulator is uncertain only about the position of the demand curves. In that
model, if C ′′(q) ≥ 0 (similar to here), setting prices at the level of marginal costs for the
reported demand is optimal (p = Cq).
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Next, I provide one technical argument explaining why Armstrong’s The-
orem about the desirability of exclusion formulated in the nonlinear pricing
context could not be extended to this regulation model.
In nonlinear pricing, the customers’ exit option is qout = 0 and tout = 0.
Hence, the natural assumptions v(0, a, b) = 0 and C(0) = 0 imply that the
monopolist’s revenue v(0, a, b)−C(0)−V (a, b) is zero when V (a, b) = 0 (that
is, when type (a, b) is excluded). Then, the monopolist’s penalty for causing
some customers to exit the market is to not receive income from them.
On the other hand, in the regulation model, the exit option of the firm
(a, b) is the unit price pout and subsidy tout at which profit V (a, b) is zero.
For such a firm, in the previous example given by (11), the regulator’s ben-
efit is (α + a − c0 − b)Q(p
out, a) − (Q(pout, a))2/2 − K (in fact, if there is
no production, this amount is −K). Thereby, in contrast with the monop-
olist, the regulator could have to assume a negative penalty by excluding a
firm. Therefore, Armstrong’s argument of comparing benefits (more income
from agents still in the market) versus penalties (zero income from agents
excluded) might not be applicable to this model.
Besides, by the model formulation, it can be understood that the regulator
has no interest of excluding the firm (for example, if the firm is already
operating and zero production is not desirable in the economy). Individual
rationality constraints reflects that for all type of firm, whether producing or
not, the subsidy must be such that the firm’s profit is at least zero.
A model in which the regulator offers a menu of prices and subsidies
at which when a firm cannot make a positive profit does not produce and
regulator pays zero, should contain an extra variable (like the r(·) variable in
Baron and Myerson (1982), Rochet (2009)) indicating the probability that
the firm will be permitted to produce. The optimal value of this variable will
indicate whether a type of firm is excluded or not.
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Appendix A: Testing the method
In this appendix, the numerical solution of problem (9) is compared with the
analytical solution of the following models in the literature: Laffont et al.
(1987) have considered that monopolist faces customers with linear demand
curves and is uncertain about both the slope and intercept of such linear
demand, which yields on linear-quadratic customers’ valuation v(q, a, b) =
aq− 1+b
2
q2. Basov (2001) proposed the Hamiltonian Approach and solved the
generalization v(q, a, b) = aq − 1+b
γ
qγ with γ ≥ 2, for which demand curves
are concave. Araujo et al. (2019) have analized a case of convex demand
curves, for which the customers’ valuation is v(q, a, b) = (c− b) log(aq + 1).
Two criteria to compare our approximations are presented. The first
one is to compute the average quadratic error (a.q.e.) between analytic
quantity Qreal and numerical quantity Qnum (the same calculation is shown
for informational rent)
a.q.e.(Qnum, Qreal) =
1
n2
n∑
i,j=1
(Qnumi,j −Q
real
i,j )
2
The second criterion is merely a visual comparison. Despite no being formal,
in practice the numerical approximations help us to formulate predictions
about the functional form of the solution, such as the participation set or
the contour levels (i.e., how types are bunching). Thus, there are provided
graphs of quantity and informational rent for both numerical and analytical
solutions, as well as their contour levels and cross-sections.
After omitted the IC constraints on the southeast for each type, it is
required to verify a posteriori if the omitted constraints are indeed strictly
satisfied. Such verification can only be numerical. For this reason, it is
provided some graphs showing whether a fixed type (ai, bj) (in blue) is IC
with all the others in Xn, drawing a green point if such IC is satisfied and a
red point if it is not. Note that all the types on the southeast of the points
considered are satisfying IC.
Because of numerical optimization, as well as the limitations by the dis-
cretization pointed out in the remarks of subsection (4.2), it does not surprise
the existence of red points in some graphs; however, the violations may be
considered small. The value of δ = δi,j in each one of the graphs indicates
the minimum violation of IC constraints between (ai, bj) and the red points.
That is, if we allow some tolerance toli,j > −δi,j, all the IC constraints will be
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verified for such (ai, bj) blue point. Furthermore, by defining δ
∗ = mini,j{δi,j}
if tol > −δ∗ then all the IC constraints will be satisfied for any type in Xn.
Such δ∗ value is provided in each example.
The numerical solutions were performed via Knitro/AMPL using the Ac-
tive Set Algorithm. Otimization process stopped if one of the following
tolerances were achieved: maxit= 104 , feastol= 10−15 , xtol= 10−15 ,
opttol= 10−15 , where maxit is the maximum number of iterations, feastol
refers to feasibility tolerance, xtol is the relative change of decision variables
and opttol is the optimality KKT sttoping tolerance. In all examples, xtol
were achieved first.
5.2 Example 1. Linear Demand
In Laffont et al. (1987) the authors have solved the monopolist’s problem
for the data
v(q, a, b) = aq −
(1 + b)
2
q2 , C(q) = 0 , f(a, b) = 1
The solutions q and T they have found are:
q(a, b) =


0 , a ≤ 12
4a− 2
4b+ 1
,
1
2
≤
a+ 2b
4b+ 1
≤
3
5
3a− 1
2 + 3b
,
3
5
≤
2a+ b
2 + 3b
≤ 1
T (q) =


q
2
−
3q2
8
, q ≤
2
5
q
3
−
q2
6
+
1
30
,
2
5
≤ q ≤ 1
Note that vq is linear in each a and b variables. Then, by Proposition 4.5,
it can be reduced even more the number of constraints. The exact number
of IC constraints is 1
2
(3n3− 3n2− 4n+4) instead of n4−n2 as in the original
problem. The problem was solved with n = 36. For this value, 67 970 IC
constraints were considered whereas 1 610 350 were ruled out.
Next, the numerical result is compared with the analytical (real) one.
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a.q.e.(Qnum, Qreal) = 3.6442×10−4
a.q.e.(V num, V real) = 0.1149×10−4∣∣∣ profitnum − profitreal ∣∣∣ = 9.6668×10−4
δ∗ = −1.70804×10−4
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Cross-sections of Informational Rent
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5.3 Example 2. Concave Demand
In Basov (2001) the author solved the original problem for the data
v(q, a, b) = aq −
(c+ b)
γ
qγ , C(q) = 0 , f(a, b) = 1
where c > 1
2
and γ ≥ 2 are constants. The solutions q and T he have found
are:
q(a, b) =


0 , a ≤ 12
( 4a− 2
4b+ 2c− 1
) 1
γ−1
, (3 + 2c)a− 2b ≤ 2c+ 1
( 3a− 1
3b+ 2c
) 1
γ−1
, (3 + 2c)a− 2b > 2c+ 1
T (q) =


q
2
−
( c2 +
1
4)
γ
qγ , q ≤
( 2
3 + 2c
) 1
γ−1
1
6
( 2
3 + 2c
) 1
γ−1
−
( c6 +
1
4)
γ
( 2
3 + 2c
) γ
γ−1
+
q
3
−
c
3γ
qγ , q >
( 2
3 + 2c
) 1
γ−1
The discretized problem was solved for the case γ = 3 with n = 30 points
over each axis. For this value, 39 092 incentive compatibility constraints were
considered, and 770 008 were eliminated.
a.q.e.(Qnum, Qreal) = 4.5853×10−4
a.q.e.(V num, V real) = 0.0384×10−4∣∣∣ profitnum − profitreal ∣∣∣ = 2.5717×10−3
δ∗ = −7.82371×10−4
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Verifying IC constraints
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5.4 Example 3. Convex Demand Curves
In Araujo et al. (2019) the authors have analized the monopolist’s problem
for the case
v(q, a, b) = (c− b) log(aq + 1) , C(q) = λq , f(a, b) = 1
where c ≥ 1 and λ ∈ (0, 1) are given. In this case, the solution proposed is
not given in a closed-form. To express the analytical solution, define
D(r) = λr(1− r)
E(r) = λ(1− r)− λr log(r)− c r(1− r)
F (r) = 2c r log(r) + c(1− r)− λ log(r)
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and let r ∈ ]0, 1[ be the solution of
(2c r − λ) log(r) + c(1− r) = 0
Also define
φ(r) =
−E(r) +
√
E(r)2 − 4D(r)F (r)
2D(r)
, ∀ r ∈ ]r, 1[
Finally, given (a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2 define q(a, b) as follows
• If b ≥ c− (cr)/a, let q(a, b) := 0.
• If b < c− (cr)/a, let r(a, b) ∈ ]r, 1[ be the solution of
c− b
br
−
c
ab
=
−E(r) +
√
E(r)2 − 4D(r)F (r)
2D(r)
such that φ(r(a, b)) > 0 and φ′(r(a, b)) > 0, and let q(a, b) := φ(r(a, b)).
Furthermore, the tariff as a function of r over ]r, 1[ can be expressed as
T (r) =
∫ r
r
vq(φ(r˜), r˜, 0)φ
′(r˜)dr˜
Agent type (a, b) has to transfer t(a, b) = T (r(a, b)) to the monopolist, which
determines V (a, b). In this way the variables q and V are defined over [0, 1]2.
On the other hand, the discretized problem was solved for the case c = 1
and λ = 0.4 with n = 34 points over each axis.
a.q.e.(Qnum, Qreal) = 2.6300×10−3
a.q.e.(V num, V real) = 2.6064×10−5∣∣∣ profitnum − profitreal ∣∣∣ = 2.3191×10−2
δ∗ = −5.77989×10−4
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Appendix B: Mathematical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Fix q ∈ Q; by Assumption 2, vq(q, ·, b) is strictly
increasing and vq(q, â, ·) is strictly decreasing, so â > a and b̂ < b im-
ply vq(q, a, b) < vq(q, â, b) and vq(q, â, b) < vq(q, â, b̂), respectively. Thus,
vq(q, a, b) < vq(q, â, b̂).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Fix (â, b̂) such that a < â and b > b̂. Define
F (x, y) := V (x, y)− v(q(â, b̂), x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ [0, â]× [̂b, 1]. Then,
Fx = Va(x, y)− va(q(â, b̂), x, y) = va(q(x, y), x, y)− va(q(â, b̂), x, y)
Fy = Vb(x, y)− vb(q(â, b̂), x, y) = vb(q(x, y), x, y)− vb(q(â, b̂), x, y)
Conditions qa ≥ 0 and qb ≤ 0 imply that q(x, y) ≤ q(â, b̂). From Assumption
2, we obtain Fx ≤ 0 and Fy ≥ 0. Then, since a < â and b > b̂, we have
F (a, b) ≥ F (â, b̂). That is, (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂).
Proof of Proposition 4.3. If (x, y) ∈ CC(â, b̂), then q(â, b̂) = q(x, y). There-
fore, by the taxation principle, t(â, b̂) = T (q(â, b̂)) = T (q(x, y)) = t(x, y).
Because (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂), we have
v(q(a, b), a, b)− t(a, b) ≥ v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− t(â, b̂) = v(q(x, y), a, b)− t(x, y)
that is, (a, b) is IC with (x, y).
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Since (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂) and (â, b̂) is IC with
(x, y), we have
V (a, b)− V (x, y)+v(q(x, y), x, y) ≥ (12)
v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− v(q(â, b̂), â, b̂) + v(q(x, y), â, b̂)
Additionally, because vq(q, â, b̂) ≤ vq(q, a, b) ∀ q ∈ Q and q(x, y) ≤ q(â, b̂),∫ q(â,̂b)
q(x,y)
vq(q, â, b̂)dq ≤
∫ q(â,̂b)
q(x,y)
vq(q, a, b)dq . Then,
v(q(â, b̂), a, b)− v(q(â, b̂), â, b̂) + v(q(x, y), â, b̂) ≥ v(q(x, y), a, b) (13)
Therefore, from (12) and (13), (a, b) is IC with (x, y).
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Proof of Theorem 4.1. Fix any (a, b), (â, b̂) ∈ [0, 1]2. Let us prove that (a, b)
is IC with (â, b̂).
If q(â, b̂) = qout (that is, if type (â, b̂) is excluded), we have V (â, b̂) = 0,
so from the IR constraint V (a, b) ≥ 0, we can write
V (a, b)− V (â, b̂) ≥ v(qout, a, b)− v(qout, â, b̂)
in view of v(qout, a, b) = v(qout, â, b̂) by Assumption 1.
If q(â, b̂) 6= qout, since CC(â, b̂) is strictly increasing, there are three
possible cases:
Case 1 CC(â, b̂) intersects F (a,b):
Let (x, y) the point of intersection. Because (a, b) is IC with (x, y) and
(x, y) ∈ CC(â, b̂), by Proposition 4.3, (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂).
Case 2 CC(â, b̂) intersects {(1, s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ b}:
Since CC(â, b̂) is strictly increasing, then b̂ < b. If â > a, by Proposition 4.1,
we have that (a, b)  (â, b̂). Then, (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂). If â ≤ a, consider
(x, y) ∈ CC(â, b̂) ∩ conv{(a, b), (1, 0)} 8. Then, (x, y) is such that x > a and
y < b, and we are in the previous case. That is, (a, b) is IC with (x, y), and
by Proposition 4.3, (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂).
Case 3 CC(â, b̂) intersects {(s, 1) : 0 ≤ s ≤ a} (Figure 2 illustrates for this
case):
Since CC(â, b̂) is strictly increasing, â < a. Without the loss of generality,
we consider that b̂ > b 9. Let (x1, 1) ∈ CC(â, b̂) ∩ {(s, 1) : 0 ≤ s ≤ a}, and
(x1, y1) ∈ {(x1, y) : y ∈ R} ∩ conv{(â, b̂), (a, b)}. Note that q(â, b̂) < q(x1, y1)
and, by Proposition 4.1, (x1, y1)  (a, b). Since (x1, y1) is IC with (x1, 1) (due
to (x1, 1) ∈ F
(x1,y1)), by Proposition 4.3, (x1, y1) is IC with (â, b̂). Then, by
Proposition 4.4, it will be sufficient that CC(x1, y1) ∩ F
(a,b) 6= ∅ to conclude
that (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂). If CC(x1, y1) ∩ F
(a,b) = ∅, repeat the procedure
taking (x2, 1) ∈ CC(x1, y1) ∩ {(s, 1) : 0 ≤ s ≤ a} and (x2, y2) ∈ {(x2, y) :
y ∈ R} ∩ conv{(x1, y1), (a, b)}. Similarly to the above, we have q(x1, y1) <
q(x2, y2), (x2, y2)  (a, b) and that (x2, y2) is IC with (x1, y1). Then, by
Proposition 4.4, it will be sufficient that CC(x2, y2) ∩ F
(a,b) 6= ∅ to conclude
that (a, b) is IC with (x1, y1), and therefore, by Proposition 4.4, that (a, b) is
IC with (â, b̂). If CC(x2, y2)∩F
(a,b) = ∅, we set up the point (x3, y3), and so
8conv{(a, b), (1, 0)} is the convex hull of these points.
9Otherwise, replace (â, b̂) for any point in CC(â, b̂) on the northwest of (a, b).
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Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 4.1 proof.
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(xn, yn)
. . .
on. Note that d
dq
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0 and d
da
(
vqa
vqb
)
≥ 0 implies d
dr
as(r, 1) ≥ 0 in view of
d
dr
as(r, 1) =
d
dr
(
−
vqb
vqa
(q(r, 1), r, 1)
)
=
( vqb
vqa
)2[ d
dq
(vqa
vqb
)
× qa(r, 1) +
d
da
(vqa
vqb
)]
That is, the slope of the characteristic curves at the border (r, 1) is non-
decreasing which guarantees that for large enough n, CC(xn, yn)∩F
(a,b) 6= ∅
because (xn, yn) will be close to (a, b) and CC(xn, yn) is strictly increasing.
Thus, applying Proposition 4.4 n times, we have that (a, b) is IC with (â, b̂).
Proof of Proposition 4.5.
1. Since vq(q, ·, b̂) is concave and vq(q, a, ·) is convex:
vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, a, b̂) ≤ vqa(q, a, b̂)(â− a)
vq(q, a, b)− vq(q, a, b̂) ≥ vqb(q, a, b̂)(b− b̂)
then
vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, a, b) ≤ vqa(q, a, b̂)(â− a) + vqb(q, a, b̂)(̂b− b)
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Besides, if (a, b)  (â, b̂) then 0 ≤ vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, a, b). Therefore
b̂− b
â− a
≤
−vqa(q, a, b̂)
vqb(q, a, b̂)
in view of â > a and −vqb > 0.
2. Since vq(q, ·, b) is concave and vq(q, â, ·) is convex:
vq(q, â, b)− vq(q, a, b) ≥ vqa(q, â, b)(â− a)
vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, â, b) ≥ vqb(q, â, b)(̂b− b)
then
vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, a, b) ≥ vqa(q, â, b)(â− a) + vqb(q, â, b)(̂b− b)
Besides, if b̂−b
â−a
≤ −vqa(q,â,b)
vqb(q,â,b)
with â > a and vqb < 0 then vqa(q, â, b)(â−
a)+ vqb(q, â, b)(̂b− b) ≥ 0 thus vq(q, â, b̂)− vq(q, a, b) ≥ 0 for any q ∈ Q,
that is (a, b)  (â, b̂)
Proof of Proposition 4.6. The proof is based on the two following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Given (a, b) ∈ Xn, ∀ (x, y) ∈ F
(a,b), we have
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(x, y) ≥ v(Q˜n(x, y), a, b)− v(Q˜n(x, y), x, y)−O( 1
n−1)
That is, since (a, b) ∈ Xn verifies IC with all points in F˜
(a,b) = F (a,b)∩Xn,
it satisfies a relaxed IC version with all points in the continuous set F (a,b)
with some tolerance that is asymptotically zero. The next lemma shows that
between any two points on the grid Xn, the same relaxed IC version holds.
Lemma 2. Given (a, b), (â, b̂) ∈ Xn, we have
V n(a, b)− V n(â, b̂) ≥ v(Qn(â, b̂), a, b)− v(Qn(â, b̂), â, b̂)−O( 1
n−1)
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We return to the proof of Proposition 4.6. Given (a, b), (a′, b′) ∈ [0, 1]2, it
will be sufficient to prove that
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(a′, b′)− (v(Q˜n(a′, b′), a, b)− v(Q˜n(a′, b′), a′, b′)) ≥ −O( 1
n−1)
Let (â, b̂), (â′, b̂′) ∈ Xn be such that â ≤ a < â + 1n−1 , b̂ −
1
n−1 < b ≤ b̂ and
â′ ≤ a′ < â′ + 1
n−1 , b̂
′ − 1
n−1 < b
′ ≤ b̂′. Let q = Q˜n(a′, b′) = Qn(â′, b̂′). Since
V˜ n(a, b) = V n(â, b̂) , V˜ n(a′, b′) = V n(â′, b̂′) we have
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(a′, b′)− (v(q, a, b)− v(q, a′, b′)) = (14)
V n(â, b̂)− V n(â′, b̂′)− (v(q, â, b̂)− v(q, â′, b̂′))
+ v(q, â, b̂)− v(q, a, b) + v(q, a′, b′)− v(q, â′, b̂′)
Since (â, b̂), (â′, b̂′) ∈ Xn, by Lemma 2,
V n(â, b̂)− V n(â′, b̂′)− (v(q, â, b̂)− v(q, â′, b̂′)) ≥ −O( 1
n−1) (15)
Besides, since v is differentiable, v(q, ·, ·) is Lipschitz over [0, 1]2 (with con-
stant L), then∣∣∣v(q, â, b̂)− v(q, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ L||(â, b̂)− (a, b)|| ≤ O( 1n−1)
which implies
v(q, â, b̂)− v(q, a, b) ≥ −O( 1
n−1) (16)
Similarly ∣∣∣v(q, a′, b′)− v(q, â′, b̂′)∣∣∣ ≤ L||(a′, b′)− (â′, b̂′)|| ≤ O( 1n−1)
which implies
v(q, a′, b′)− v(q, â′, b̂′) ≥ −O( 1
n−1) (17)
Therefore, from (14) using (15), (16) and (17) we obtain
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(a′, b′)− (v(q, a, b)− v(q, a′, b′)) ≥ −O( 1
n−1)
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Proof of Lemma 1. Let (x, y) ∈ F (a,b) be such that x = 1 (case y = 1 is
analogous), and let b̂ be such that b̂ − 1
n−1
< y ≤ b̂. Since (Qn, V n) are the
solutions of problem (9), (a, b) satisfies IC with (1, b̂)
V n(a, b)− V n(1, b̂) ≥ v(Qn(1, b̂), a, b)− v(Qn(1, b̂), 1, b̂)
By definition, Q˜n(x, y) = Qn(1, b̂) and V˜ n(x, y) = V n(1, b̂) . Additionally, in
view of (a, b) ∈ Xn, we have V˜
n(a, b) = V n(a, b). Then,
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(x, y) ≥ v(Q˜n(x, y), a, b)− v(Q˜n(x, y), 1, b̂) (18)
On the other hand, since v is Lipschitz,∣∣∣v(Q˜n(x, y), 1, b̂)− v(Q˜n(x, y), x, y)∣∣∣ ≤ L||(1, b̂)− (x, y)|| = O( 1n−1)
Then,
−v(Q˜n(x, y), 1, b̂) ≥ −v(Q˜n(x, y), x, y)−O( 1
n−1) (19)
Therefore, from (18) and (19),
V˜ n(a, b)− V˜ n(x, y) ≥ v(Q˜n(x, y), a, b)− v(Q˜n(x, y), x, y)−O( 1
n−1)
Proof of Lemma 2. If CC(â, b̂)∩F (a,b) = (x, y), we apply Lemma 1 for (a, b)
with (x, y), and considering that Qn(â, b̂) = Qn(x, y) and t(x, y) = t(â, b̂), we
conclude. Other cases are treated analogously as in the proof of Theorem
4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Let (Q, V ) denote the solution for the continuous
problem, and let (Q
n
, V
n
) be their restriction on the grid Xn. If (Q
n, V n)
are the solutions of the discretized problem and OPTn is the optimal value,
we have
OPTn ≥
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w(i, j)(v(Q
n
i,j, ai, bj)− V
n
i,j − C(Q
n
i,j))f(ai, bj)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(v(Q(a, b), a, b)− V (a, b)− C(Q(a, b)))f(a, b) da db−O(
1
n
)
= OPT ∗ −O(
1
n
)
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Then, lim infn→∞OPTn ≥ OPT
∗.
On the other hand, if ∃ limn→∞ Q˜
n(a, b) and limn→∞ V˜
n(a, b) for any
(a, b) ∈ [0, 1]2, define
Q̂(a, b) := lim
n→∞
Q˜n(a, b) , V̂ (a, b) := lim
n→∞
V˜ n(a, b)
By Proposition 4.6, (Q̂, V̂ ) is feasible. Hence
OPT ∗ ≥
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(v(Q̂(a, b), a, b)− V̂ (a, b)− C(Q̂(a, b)))f(a, b) da db
= lim
n→∞
(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(v(Q˜n(a, b), a, b)− V˜ n(a, b)− C(Q˜n(a, b)))f(a, b) da db
)
= lim
n→∞
( n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w(i, j)(v(Q˜ni,j , ai, bj)− V˜
n
i,j − C(Q˜
n
i,j))f(ai, bj) +O(
1
n−1)
)
= lim
n→∞
( n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
w(i, j)(v(Qni,j , ai, bj)− V
n
i,j − C(Q
n
i,j))f(ai, bj) +O(
1
n−1)
)
= lim
n→∞
(
OPTn +O(
1
n−1)
)
where equalities are true by the dominated convergence theorem (each Q˜n
and V˜ n are bounded), by the finite approximation of the integral, by the def-
inition of Q˜n and V˜ n, and because (Qn, V n) is the solution of the discretized
problem.
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